This paper draws upon the work of the syncretic Chinese Marxist Li Dazhao to elaborate an idea of "global thought" which is more than just a localized form of Western knowledge. Li's work offers both an example, and also a theory, of global thought: his work emerges from the intersection of multiple trajectories of thought with diverse origins, and in the process offers a theory of agency to explain how action in the present renders those trajectories intelligible as lineages which can inspire future innovations. I argue that this opens the possibility for a global thought defined by a plurality of lineages, whose continuities stretch into the history and future of Asia as well as of Europe. I suggest two such lineages for Li's work here: one links Li's work to contemporary Chinese responses; the other to scholarship in political and social theory which emphasizes the vitalist role of time in the exercise of agency. These comparisons demonstrate the extent to which global thought such as Li's transforms where (and when) thinking in the present and future might ground its arguments, and from which historical materials it might draw its resources.
through time as Li suggests, I situate Li's own thought as global: I do this not only by exploring the character of his global influences, but also and more importantly by showing how his work orients two different and typically unrelated trajectories of thought. His vitalist, material understanding of time draws him close to contemporary and current scholarship influenced by Marxism and Darwinism, even as his insistence on the efficacy of selfcultivation evokes neo-Confucian commitments to world-ordering. However, and again following Li's own recommendations, I suggest that these trajectories do not determine Li's thought, so much as our reading of Li's thought determines how we view such trajectories.
This reading clarifies some interpretive problems that have plagued scholarship on Li Dazhao and his Chinese contemporaries, which like much thought from colonial or semi-colonial societies tends to be imperfectly understood when read as a repository of poorly digested Western ideas. More importantly, however, it shows that global thought such as Li's comes into being at the intersection of multiple trajectories of thought circulating in diverse spaces, even as it acts to render those trajectories intelligible as lineages of present thought and action.
In other words, Li's thought transforms not only the future production of knowledge, but also how we identify and organize those resources from the past which are seen to inform it. In my conclusion, I consider how this re-orientation enhances the capacity of globally diffuse yet typically marginalized ("non-Western") thought to shape present and future knowledgeproduction. Establishing or maintaining continuities with this thought resists the historical ruptures which confine it to the spaces of the "traditional" or even "historical," and so validates its relevance to our knowledge in the present and future.
Time and Agency
Li Dazhao and his contemporaries faced a world of constant change. The revolution of 1911 ended the nearly three-hundred-year-old Qing dynasty, establishing republican government for the first time in China's history. The instability which accompanied the new regime, marked by the threat of Euro-American imperialism as well as domestic fragmentation and economic collapse, intensified ongoing efforts by intellectuals to make sense of China's future within a global order now centered outside its borders.
2 By the end of the Qing, growing recognition of China as just one part of a broader world encouraged many reformers to frame China as a stage or site of da tong, an immanent "great commonality"
constituted by the interdependent causation of all things in the cosmos. 3 Intellectuals were particularly drawn to Western scholarship which offered explanations for China's past failures and schemes for improving its future in terms of its place within a global milieu, such as social Darwinism, evolutionary theory, and, increasingly, critiques of capitalist industrial development.
Li Dazhao was the most theoretically sophisticated of those who articulated the ways in which human actions might respond to and embody such cosmic interdependency, extending the da tong concepts of an earlier generation to consider how agents might act within, while transforming, the geopolitical reality they confronted. His academic and popular work over a period of more than a decade specified this problem as how time bridges when the "now" perpetually presents itself as a moment of action. In a 1918 essay titled "Now" (jin, lit., "currentness," or "presentness") Li situates human actions within a stretch of historical time that carries with it an ever-growing accumulation of ideas from the past, even as that same movement of time also makes possible infinite transformations in the futureand, indeed, also of the past:
The actions from an age do not disappear, but still remain within the next age; and in this way being transmitted infinitely, [those actions] are imbued with a linking to the infiniteness of the world…. Limitless 'pasts' all take 'now' as their point of refuge;
and limitless 'futures' all take 'now' as their source.
5
Li goes on to explain that it is the 'now' that completes the linkage between past and future, comprising the "great reality" (da shizai) that is eternity, marked by its lack of either beginning or end. 6 Therefore, the past is not "dead," because time and its history is "the process of human life, the continuation of human life, the transformations of human life, the transmissions of human life; it is a thing with a life, a living thing, a progressive thing, a developing thing, a circulating and changing thing." Time is "an open-ended becoming," to use the description Elizabeth Grosz offers for the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. 8 Human agents who desire the power to act efficaciously in such a world must therefore consider not only the actions and concerns of other humans, but also the vitalist force that is time. By placing ourselves within the unceasing "torrent" of reality that time presents to us, we must learn to shape our goals and expectations in ways that can be served by and blend with time: We can say that the torrent of "great reality" perpetually races from a beginningless reality to an endless reality. Our self, our life, also perpetually blends with all the trends of life, following the current of great reality, so as to create breadth, continuity (duan xu), evolutionary transformation (jin zhuan), and development. Therefore, reality is movement; life is flow (liu zhuan).
9
Having the power to take action in the present, to Li, therefore takes on a particular shape that is necessarily rather than coincidentally related to time. In this passage, he reflects both
Bergson's notion of "duration," which, like the Book of Changes, confronts time as "the unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge of novelty." 10 For Li as for Bergson, "in duration, considered as a creative evolution, there is perpetual creation of possibility and not only of reality." 11 Human beings are not constrained by time, as agents are constrained by structures; but nor are they masters of time. Rather, they are part of the life that constitutes time, and vice-versa. In the Changes and its commentaries, the specific content of our actions, and the exercise of our power, appears similarly within the infinite and ceaseless condition of "backing and forthing" emblematized in the four seasons. 12 Li follows Jin Shengtan, the late Ming-early Qing literary commentator, to understand the Changes' concepts of zhou and yi as "constancy" (chang wang) and "transformation" (bian yi) in a ceaseless process of renewal (ri ri xin). 13 For Li, embracing this succession of time involves creating breadth, continuity, progressive transformation, and development, which shifts the emphasis to innovation 9 Li, "Jin," 534. action, and makes no movement, then the now of this moment returns to nonexistence; the life of this moment is nothing more than a loss.
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These passages help to situate Li vis-à-vis the Marxist historical materialism with which he is often associated, even as the inevitability of time's flow-marked, it seems, by ongoing transformations of material and economic conditions-grounds a peculiar and distinctly nonMarxist claim about human agency. In essays such as "My Views on Marxism" and "Material Changes and Changes in Morality," Li claims outright that thought, "isms,"
philosophy, religion, morality, and law are unable to restrain material and economic changes. 25 The arrow of this relationship only goes one way: economics and material conditions can wreak changes in ideational structures. 26 However, Li points out the contradiction between Marx's belief that productive forces are the motive power of history, versus claiming that all history is that of class struggle. 27 Li interprets Marx's mandate for a future socialism as calling for the promotion of ethical correction and the cultivation of humanist (rendao) movements in the present, in order to eliminate the bad habits and evil natures that humans have received from past history. You cannot wait for materialist changes, Li insists, and this is a point where Marxist theory needs to be corrected. Instead,
We advocate using humanism to create a humanist spirit (renlei jingshen), and at the same time to use socialism to change economic organization. Without changing economic organization, and to seek only to change a humanist spirit, would be 24 Li, "Shi (Time)," 666. 25 26 Li, "Wuzhi Biandong," 139. 27 Li, "Wo de Makesi Zhuyi Guan," 63.
ineffective. But not to change economic organization, and to seek only to change the humanist spirit, would also unfortunately be unsuccessful. We advocate simultaneous changes to both the material and spiritual, heart and matter at the same time. 28 Li concludes on the basis of this relationship between material forces and reality that we must craft a morality that suits our new situation, "a morality of people, beauty, practicality, great commonality (da tong), mutual aid, and creativity!" to satisfy the demands of a materially interconnected age. 29 The earlier Chinese reform ideal of da tong, reached through a long process of humanist cultivation in both self and society, here reworks historical materialism to produce a dialectical and mutually dependent process of social transformation. Like many of his intellectual colleagues-including Liang Qichao and Zhang Shizhao-Li theorizes a reform strategy which tacks between the internal human effort often associated with moral renovation, on the one hand, and changes in the external, material world associated with political and economic institutions, on the other. 30 His activism embodies this dual commitment by resisting a unilateral strategy which turns solely on social revolution or a long wait for transformation in the means of production. 31 In contrast to Marxist historiography, which tends to read time as a series of strategic points, Li emphasizes instead the potential of the present moment, each "now" promising a fugitive moment for action that alone can engender the future.
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These considerations help us understand how Li's idea of "extension," mentioned above, comprises a unique and dynamic theory of agency. To borrow phrasing from Diana 28 Ibid., 68. This synthesis maps on also to his earlier call for a blending of "Eastern" and "Western" civilizations, in which Western materialism and activism is tempered by the spirituality and humanism of how it explains these sources in terms of lineages which inform, even as they are created by, interventions in the present. We are then in a better position to understand his thought as "global," in that it inaugurates-even as it must be understood in terms of-not one but multiple trajectories, which arise from diverse regions of the world to inform conversations that are no longer local in either scope or character.
Essentials portrays history as an evolving (rather than unfurling) narrative about human life activity. 34 "What is living history, true history?" Li asks. "Speaking simply, history is human life and the culture it produces"-an inexhaustible totality, whose "facts"
(shi shi) are vivid, alive, and ceaselessly changing: be considered a historical reality. And a historical reality is something temporary, which is determined by the times and changes with the times; it is not fast-and-hard.
Historical realities are of two kinds: one that says that materials about an event that has occurred are correct; and the other that says an interpretation about an event that has occurred are correct. The first changes relatively rarely; the latter changes with the times. Interpretations are knowledge with respect to facts, and knowledge increases and expands every day, so therefore interpretations change every day. There is also a 34 My choice of terms here invokes Bergson's distinction between "evolution"--the eruption of the radically new--and "unfurling"--the re-arrangement of the pre-existing. See Bergson, The Creative Mind, 10. 35 Li, Shi Xue Yao Lun, 714-5, 717 On the basis of the holistic nature of the life activity history documents, Li calls for the formation of a new field of inquiry called "humanistic study" (ren wen xue) (734).
real past, and a historical past: the real past is over, dead, gone; the past event is done, finished; past persons are gone in an instant, and can never come back; expecting any change from them is forever impossible. That which can be expanded and enlarged is not the past itself, but our knowledge about the past. 36 Li's insistence that the facts of history change constantly reflects his view that facts are themselves the product of new histories, which are constantly being created and as such remain beyond definitive anticipation. As the present changes, so too does the past, a transformation Li associates with positive progress toward truth. 37 Although he insists that the growth of a "science" of history requires the search and discovery of certain "general principles" (li fa) by the historian, "the reality of history is always in development, in progress; there is no history that is complete." This means that conclusions reached are always tentative, such that "recorded history must also be ceaselessly modified."
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Here Li departs markedly from Liang Qichao's views on historiography, put forward around the turn of the century, which according to Tang Xiaobing identified history with "reorganizing the past as a rational, collective experience around a reinvented agency" of the nation-state. 39 Li's point is rather to emphasize the emergent, uncertain character of social development-seeing it as an open-ended evolution whose jagged unfolding is made possible through human agency, rather than a teleological movement toward a fixed goal that societies perpetually lag behind. Wu Shu-chin has ascribed Li's resistance to Darwinian notions of social progress to his awareness of China's place within a larger world. clarity." 42 Becoming in tune with events as they occur, we develop a self-awareness that leads us to discover within history our own world, our own selves, making us aware of our own power (quan wei), knowing that past history is precisely what everyone (ren ren) has created, and that the history that spans from now to the future is also of this nature. 43 Li's vision of agency recognizes that history changes every day alongside the future. To think that the ancient past is somehow ahead of us, and the yet-to-come is somehow behind us, Li argues, is to contradict the reality of the development of great nature and great reality; the start of our history "lies not in the ancients, but in the present; it hastens not toward the broad Confucian orthodoxy since the fourteenth century, efficacious political activity was seen as constitutive, rather than a precondition for, the proper channeling of this energy from one's self to one's society and beyond. At the same time, such channeling both presupposed and fashioned a particular kind of subjectivity.
Until the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, that subjectivity was construed as a ritually disciplined scholar-official. Under the republic, it was replaced by an image of a self-aware, national citizen oriented in the right way to the right kinds of worldly circumstances (in Li's case, the ontological conditions of time). These visions often produced a well-noted tension between the ongoing rectification of consciousness by late imperial literati as well as republican citizens, on the one hand, and their repeated inability to produce the outer world they meant to secure, on the other-in the process engendering an anxiety-inducing failure to 46 We who are young and hot-blooded, standing in this great, whirling current should have fortitude and independent will to stand firm, resisting the current's force, 48 of gaining self-awareness constitutes, and not merely supplements or grounds, the actions of a properly democratic actor, even as it is self-awareness that makes democracy possible. On this point Li's ideas dovetail with an emerging literature on political agency that situates human power within a range of non-human material conditions. In the words of theorist Elizabeth Grosz, for this "new materialist" approach, matter or nature "is construed as a force, provocation, activity, or incitement, rather than, as is the current fashion in feminist and cultural studies, where nature is considered an inert passivity onto which life, have the capacity not only to block human designs but also to be "actants"-forces with trajectories, propensities, and tendencies of their own. 58 The theories of agency formulated by this "new materialist" literature emphasize, in light of research on entropy, complexity, and cognition, the emergent rather than "given" character of that agency. New materialists emphasize the ways in which the quantity, character, and scope of agency takes shape through its embeddedness in broad, contingent material constellations. And, much like Li's call to youth to hold firm as rocks in a stream, they recognize that efficacious action requires particular kinds of attitudes: events such as the "modern history" Li evokes inaugurate new configurations of possibilities, but they can "'happen' to us only if we are in the right disposition." 59 On this reading, agency does not simply equate to a prefigured and transparent causal input to particular social contexts; it is not brought to the political or social arena so much as recognized as one capacity spontaneously and unevenly created within those arenas. In Li's case, the constituent force that makes possible human agency is time. The ongoing flow of time grounds Li's understanding of agency as having a material as well as abstract character.
"Our life is an eternity within time, an eternity expressed in the present moment, not in the past or the future…the sole thing really within our grasp is now." 60 The capacities that enable this action in the present is not a property of the human body, but of a situation in which that body finds itself 61 -located as it is in between past and future.
These two comparisons-between the formulations of agency by his historical contemporaries, on one hand, and a series of current debates about the role played by materialist forces in human efficacy, on the other-help to situate Li's contribution across time as well as space. But to understand the significance of his work solely in terms of these two approaches would fail to heed Li's own theory about the way action in the present inevitably remakes the past, rather than assumes it; in the process, it would reproduce those problematic frameworks in which global thought remains understood in terms of existing approaches and concerns. To follow Li, we should use the agentic capacities of the present to rework the very historical grounding of future action and thought. Rather than see his work as a derivation of what others have done or are doing, we must also inscribe Li's particularities as redirections or potentially disruptive formulations of the problem he shares with these two approaches.
We might begin by noting an important contrast between Li and current political theories of agency, namely the former's lack of attention to freedom as a motivation or goal.
This is significant because of the historically tight associations in much western political theory between power, and thus the capacity to act identified with agency, and freedom. The fact that Li's agency is not preoccupied with freedom (or its corollary, individual responsibility) suggests that it sources a different kind of power-one that is cosmologically informed rather than derived exclusively from human effort. 66 His anti-imperialist turn after the end of World War I shows that he was not entirely uninterested in modern-day notions of collective democratic action or governmental power. But his calls to action, even after his definitive "conversion" to Marxism in 1920, bank almost exclusively on the formation of particular kinds of subjectivities that merge with ongoing cosmic (or ontological) movements, particularly time. These observations suggest that, for Li, power is best characterized as an influence that emerges from situational leverage; it is not the application of force that attempts to control particular outcomes. We must accept our placement in the flow of time, which exists outside of our total control, even as we must "think" our present as a singular moment in which to act.
Human agency, therefore, is not something that accumulates or is quantifiable. It grows stronger, but not in the sense that some agent accumulates more guarantees of, or doi:10.1177/0961463X11399174, who argues that the focus of recent accounts of temporality on freedom stem from an unjustified subjective experientialism. 64 Krause, "Bodies in Action," 318, 300. 65 Coole, "Rethinking Agency," 125. 66 As has often been noted, de-anthropomorphization of agency. 70 As themselves conglomerates or centers of cosmic activity, human subjects retain an important ability to focus these forces in a way that complies with but also exceeds them. He would agree in a limited way with Krause, who 67 This dual commitment to both changing external situations and changing human potentialities is captured in a recurrent debate over "good men" versus "good laws," one iteration of which is examined in Jenco, " argues that subjectivity-"the capacity to stand in reflexive relation to oneself"-is the very thing that distinguishes agency from mere cause. controlling. 74 Like current discussions on material agency, however, these Marxist positions suggest the direction of Li's trajectory only in ways that continue, but do not determine, it.
Li Dazhao and Global Thought
The Recent work in comparative political theory has suggested ways out of these binds, largely through mutual transformation through dialogic interaction. The hope is to interrogate Eurocentric characterizations of modernity which shore up boundaries between "our" civilization and "their" tradition. 81 These techniques address the future of global theorizing by suggesting the greater inclusion of historically marginalized voices to our ongoing conversations about political life. They do not, however, directly address the way temporal narratives themselves can be decentered, or past lineages implicated, in the service of this new future. To do so, Hutchings urges the cultivation of a "heterotemporal orientation" to question the fusion of the theorist's present with "the" present of world politics. 82 Li's theory of agency, I contend, enables precisely such an orientation, by drawing attention to the ways in which global thought (such as his own) calls into being-rather than assumes the given existence of-particular yet heterogenous lineages of past thought, sourced from diverse sites of human experience, which go on to inform future modes of thinking and acting. Li's approach reveals that global thought does not exist in a series of parallel tracks, where thinkers always-already exist within some given genealogy and continue to produce thought in its name. Nor does global thought imply some point of intersection between Chinese and
Western thought, such that one instance of comparison is sufficient to capture its novelty.
Rather, as Li himself would contend, the creation of global thought is transformative and its processes ongoing. This view has important implications for the role of historicallymarginalized bodies of thought in the production of new knowledge.
Typically, as I mentioned above, inclusion of such thought has taken the form of episodic moments of translation or dialogue. In contrast, Li offers a new way by which such thought-in his case, the Confucianism that, by the end of the Qing dynasty, was already subject to contestation and cross-fertilization by other bodies of thought-does more than merely interrupt or chasten some given stream of "modern" (usually read "Western") Li's work with contemporary and ongoing discussions of political subjectivity in China.
This is why the two trajectories I have offered here are not usefully described as an internal, particular, Chinese one in contrast to a Western, external, universal (or general) one.
Following Li, we might see them as constructing two different pasts for thought whose application is necessarily global rather than local, dynamic rather than static. In that sense, both trajectories self-consciously pose (rather than disingenuously claim to "discover") a continuity for certain threads within the historically variegated heterogeneity of global thought. These trajectories form both the precedent and the horizon within which particular actors envision their moments of action (their "nows"), but also provide an orientation for how those actions and ideas may apply to other actors and societies in the future. As Claudia Pozzana notes, Li is trying to "locate a theoretical division of time that can allow us to think of time in its singularity as well as in its relation to eternity."
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These continuities enable the production of knowledge in ways that build from, rather than truncate, indigenous or colonized thought. This is particularly significant at a time when the very globalization of academic knowledge-production has resulted not in a proliferation of knowledge nourished by various local resources, but its standardization along lines of 83 Pozzana, "Spring, Temporality, and History in Li Dazhao," 289. These attachments, as Sheldon Pollock has pointed out in his influential examination of the early-modern Sanskrit cosmopolis, are distinct from the mere circulation of things, which "carry no hint of belonging." 85 Pollock speaks of the attachments created by literature, but we may extend this to include also the performance of global thought, whose own creation or consumption of ideas "meant for large worlds or small places is a declaration of affiliation with that world or place." 86 Li's intervention suggests that in this particular case neo-Confucian world-ordering may offer a disciplinary resource to inflect future work in new materialism, in the process "relocating" or "re-centering" its thinking. 87 The cultivation of such attachments enables not only the provincialization of new materialism, in the sense that its adherents become more reflexive about the exclusions constituted by their own claims to knowledge, but also its globalization: such thought must regard neo-Confucianism as part of the imagined community to which it speaks, and the heritage from which it gains clarity about its own purpose. It therefore becomes important to get these diverse pasts right, even 
